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I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of the current interpretation of the federal firearm
possession sentencing statute are severe, often mandating the
imposition of de facto life sentences for first-time offenders. For
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example, suppose a twenty-three-year-old first-time offender was
found guilty in a federal district court of robbing $500 from two
financial institutions in two days and carrying a single firearm during
the robbery spree.1 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this
first-time offender would be subject to a sentence ranging between
forty-one and fifty-one months for each robbery.2 Thus, for the
substantive offenses, the sentence would total eighty-two to 102
months, or six years and ten months to eight years and six months.
But because the offender was found to have been carrying a
firearm, he could also be convicted of two counts of possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and thus subject to
additional, mandatory sentences. 3 Under the current interpretation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ("§ 924(c)"), the offender would be subject to a five-
year sentence for the first firearm possession count in accordance with
§ 924(c)(1)(A) and a twenty-five-year sentence for the second firearm
possession count in the same proceeding in accordance with
§ 924(c)(1)(C). Added together and without any adjustments by the
trial judge, the total sentence for this hypothetical crime spree ranges
from thirty-six years and ten months to thirty-eight years and six
months. Serving his full sentence, the twenty-three-year-old first-time
offender would thus be in prison until he is around sixty years old.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 abolished
parole in the federal prison system, so federal inmates must now serve
at least eighty-five percent of their sentences.4
As the above hypothetical scenario reveals, criminal sentencing
in federal courts is shaped by both the advisory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines" or "Guidelines"), created by the
1. This is a federal crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113. This hypothetical is based on the
author's observation of the sentencing of Darryl Taylor on June 11, 2009, in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2009). Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the baseline offense level for robbery of a federal institution is
twenty-two. Id. § 2B3.1. With no prior convictions or sentences, the offender has a criminal
history level of zero, id. § 4Al.1, which falls under Level I in the federal guidelines' Sentencing
Table, id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
4. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (D. Utah 2004), affd, 433
F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the federal system allows no parole and limits good-time
reductions to approximately fifteen percent of the sentence); PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. PAROLE
COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 26 (2003), available at http://www.justice.
gov/uspclhistory.pdf (noting that the Comprehensive Crime Control Act eliminated parole and
provided for good-time reductions limited to about fifteen percent of the sentence).
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United States Sentencing Commission,5 and by mandatory statutory
provisions, passed by Congress. 6 In this example, § 924(c)(1)(A)
mandates a minimum five-year sentence for the possession of a
firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking
offense, and § 924(c)(1)(C) mandates a minimum twenty-five-year
sentence for possession of a firearm in the case of a "a second or
subsequent conviction."
7
Since the passage of § 924(c) as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968, federal courts have applied two competing interpretations of the
"second or subsequent conviction" language. The first interpretation
understands "conviction" as a finding of guilt and imposition of a
sentence. As such, the heightened sentence for a "second or
subsequent conviction" would apply only to § 924(c) counts in a
separate, later indictment; in the first indictment, courts would
impose consecutive five-year sentences for multiple § 924(c) counts.
8
This first interpretation understands § 924(c)(1)(C) to be a purely
recidivist provision. The second interpretation finds "conviction" to
mean only a finding of guilt, such that the heightened sentence for a
"second or subsequent conviction" applies to multiple § 924(c) counts
in a single indictment. 9
In 1993, the Supreme Court adopted the latter interpretation
in Deal v. United States, construing "conviction" to mean simply a
finding of guilt by judge or jury,10 rather than both the finding of guilt
and imposition of the sentence. This interpretation allows for the
imposition of the enhanced § 924(c)(1)(C) sentence in a single
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.1 (2009). Congress established the United
States Sentencing Commission and delegated authority to the Commission to create federal
sentencing guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). In 2005, the Supreme Court held that application
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines must be advisory rather than mandatory and that the
mandatory provision of the federal sentencing statute must be excised. United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
6. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir 1989) (affirming the
imposition of three consecutive five-year sentences for three § 924(c) violations in a single
indictment).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the
enhanced sentence for a "second or subsequent conviction" to a second § 924(c) violation charged
in a single indictment).
10. 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). The Deal Court distinguished Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(b)(1)-the predecessor to current rule 32(k)(1)-which stated that a "judgment of
conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence." Id.
(quoting former FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(1) (1988) (repealed 1994)). The Court implied that if a
"judgment of conviction" meant both "adjudication and sentence," then "conviction" could not also
mean "adjudication and sentence." Id.
20111 1007
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
prosecution in which an offender is convicted of two or more § 924(c)
counts. In practical terms, a defendant will receive the twenty-five-
year sentence whenever he is found guilty of more than one § 924(c)
count, even in the same prosecution.
Prior to the Deal decision in 1993, however, many federal
courts accepted § 924(c)(1)(C) as a purely recidivist provision,
declining to apply the enhanced "second or subsequent conviction"
sentence to multiple firearm charges in the same indictment. 1 This
meant an offender would be sentenced under § 924(c)(1)(C) only if the
offender committed a § 924(c) offense, was convicted, served the
sentence, and committed a subsequent § 924(c) violation. Under this
interpretation, the hypothetical offender described above would
receive two five-year sentences for the two firearm possession counts,
producing a total sentence between sixteen years and ten months and
eighteen years and six months for the robbery spree. The offender
would be out of prison around age forty instead of age sixty.
This twenty-year difference based on alternate interpretations
of "second or subsequent conviction" is a dramatic disparity with
potentially life-altering consequences for the offenders sentenced
under § 924(c). In the seventeen years since the Deal decision, its
harsher interpretation has been widely implemented by the lower
courts, often with reluctance and criticism, and has had unfair and
devastating impacts on § 924(c) offenders. 12 Because of its severe
effects, the results of the interpretation in Deal should not be
implemented lightly. Today's political climate is less harsh toward
criminal punishment than when Deal was decided, as evidenced by
the parallel trends of increased criticism of mandatory minimum
sentences13 and increased judicial discretion in sentencing.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372, 373-74, 378 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming
three consecutive five-year sentences for three counts of carrying a firearm in relation to a crime
of violence in violation of § 924(c)); United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1989)
(affirming three consecutive five-year sentences for three violations of § 924(c)); United States v.
Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming two consecutive five-year sentences
for two § 924(c) violations); United States v. Godwin, 758 F. Supp. 281, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(finding that two § 924(c) firearm counts stemming from multiple robberies during a single two-
week robbery spree did not merit an enhanced sentence under § 924(c)(1)(C)).
12. First-time offenders can receive sentences for multiple § 924(c) counts in a single
indictment that "far exceed[ ]" sentences for "aircraft hijacking, second degree murder,
espionage, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape." Paul Cassell, U.S. Dist. Judge for the
Dist. of Utah, Statement on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States Before the
House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (June
2007), in 19 FED. SENT'G. REP. 344, 344 (2007).
13. See Eva S. Nilsen, Indecent Standards: The Case of U.S. Versus Weldon Angelos, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537, 554 (2006) ("It is fair to say that today's social and political
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This Note argues for a reexamination of the interpretation of
§ 924(c)(1)(C) by either Congress or the Supreme Court. Part II
provides the background of the passage of § 924(c) and its application
both prior to and in Deal v. United States. The lack of legislative
history surrounding the statute helps explain the origin of the
competing lines of interpretation and supports the need to employ
interpretive mechanisms to understand and apply § 924(c)(1)(C).
Part III assesses the Deal decision and its subsequent criticism,
analyzing the decision's interpretation and implications in light of the
theories and tools of statutory interpretation, the purposes of criminal
punishment, and the tension between mandatory minimums and
increased judicial discretion in sentencing. Part IV calls for either
Congress or the Supreme Court to reevaluate Deal's interpretation of
the "second or subsequent conviction" language of § 924(c)(1)(C). In
order to clarify the statute as a recidivist provision and prevent
egregiously unjust sentences, Congress should specify that a "second
or subsequent conviction" refers to an offense committed after an
indictment and conviction for a previous § 924(c) violation.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court should overturn the Deal decision,
finding the enhanced sentence for a "second or subsequent conviction"
to apply only to true recidivists, not to those who commit multiple
§ 924(c) offenses in a single episode. And if an explicit change by
Congress or the Supreme Court to the interpretation of § 924(c) is
untenable, Congress should revise its understanding and application
of mandatory minimum sentences to allow for more equitable
sentencing of § 924(c) offenders.
II. BACKGROUND: THE DEAL WITH DEAL
A. Enacting and Amending 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)
Congress enacted § 924(c) as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968.14 The provision was initially offered on July 17, 1968 as an
amendment to the Gun Control Act on the House floor.
15
climate is different, and less harsh toward crime and punishment, than that of the previous two
decades. Public opinion has softened with the knowledge that extraordinarily long prison
sentences for so many people have exacted unwarranted financial and human costs.").
14. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
15. United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citing 114 CONG. REC.
22,231 (1968)). Representative Casey offered the original version of the amendment. Id.
Representative Poff offered a revised version of the amendment in the House on July 19, 1968.
Christopher L. Robbins, Note, Double-Barreled Prosecution: Linking Multiple Section 924(c)
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Representatives Casey of Texas and Poff of Virginia offered different
amended versions, and the House ultimately passed the Poff
amendment. 16 After some modifications, the House's version of the bill
came out of the Conference Committee, and both chambers later
passed that version.17
The statute's passage was hurried, resulting in sparse
legislative history with only a few generic statements explaining the
intent behind § 924(c). The House debate does not reveal Congress's
understanding of "second or subsequent conviction," but rather
includes only broad statements about the overall purposes of the Act.
These statements can reasonably support § 924(c) both as a harsh
penalty for the use of guns in committing violent or drug trafficking
crimes and as a recidivist provision, applying the enhanced sentence
for a "second or subsequent conviction" only if the offender commits
the second § 924(c) violation after conviction for the first offense.
Representative Poff, one of the statute's sponsors, stated that the
purpose of the mandatory sentences was "[t]o persuade the man who
is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his gun at home."18
Regarding the enhanced sentence of § 924(c)(1)(C), Poff stated in
ambiguous terms that "[an offender] should further understand that if
he does so a second time, he is going to jail for a longer time."19
Representative Rogers echoed this general explanation, stating that
"[a]ny person who commits a crime and uses a gun will know that he
cannot get out of serving a penalty in jail.... And if he does it a
second time, there will be a stronger penalty."20 Both of these
statements indicate that § 924(c) was intended to deter offenders from
committing a crime with a gun "a second time," which does not clearly
reveal how "second or subsequent offense" should be interpreted.
The Conference Committee report only contains information as
to which portions of the House and Senate versions were adopted.
21
There are no committee hearings or reports expanding on the
Violations to a Single Predicate Offense, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1580 n.12 (1996) (citing 114
CONG. REC. 22,231 (1968)). Senator Dominick sponsored the Senate amendment. Id. at 1580 n. 14
(citing 114 CONG. REC. 27,142 (1968)).
16. George P. Apostolides, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)--The Court's Construction of "Use" and
"Second or Subsequent Conviction", 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1006, 1008 (1994).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1520 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
22,231 (1968)).
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 22,237 (1968)).
21. H.R. REP. No. 90-1956, at 5 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426,
4431.
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purposes and interpretations of the statute and its language. Further,
no definition of "second or subsequent conviction" was given when the
statute was passed.
The current version of the statute reads, in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years....
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person
shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years .... 22
B. Pre-Deal Application of 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)
The Supreme Court first addressed § 924(c) in 1978 in Simpson
v. United States.23 In that case, multiple offenders were found guilty of
committing two bank robberies less than two months apart and of
using firearms to commit the offenses. 24 The offenders received a
separate jury trial for each bank robbery. 25 The defendants received
ten years' imprisonment for each § 924(c) violation.26 While it did not
directly discuss the interpretation of "second or subsequent
conviction," the Court did not take issue with the district court's
imposition of two consecutive ten-year sentences for the firearms
counts, the maximum first-time offender sentence under
§ 924(c)(1)(A), rather than finding the second firearm count to be a
"second or subsequent conviction" meriting the heightened sentence of
§ 924(c)(1)(C).27 The fact that the Court did not object to the lower
court's § 924(c) sentencing implies that the federal courts correctly
understood § 924(c)(1)(C) to be a purely recidivist provision, 28 meaning
that the courts did not intend for enhanced sentences under
§ 924(c)(1)(C) to apply if a defendant had not yet served his first
sentence. Justice Stewart echoed this sentiment two years later in his
dissent in Busic v. United States, remarking that § 924(c) has "stiff
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (C) (2006).
23. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
24. Id. at 8-9.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id.
27. The Court ultimately held that a § 924(c) sentence is improper in cases in which an
offender is also sentenced under § 2113(d), a bank-robbery statute with an increased penalty for
the use of a firearm. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 9.
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sanctions for first offenders and even stiffer sanctions for
recidivists."29
An alternative understanding of § 924(c)(1)(C)'s "second or
subsequent conviction" provision did not appear until nineteen years
after the statute's enactment, in the Eleventh Circuit case of United
States v. Rawlings.30 In Rawlings, the defendant was convicted of
using a firearm to rob two separate banks within the span of three
weeks. 31 The district court originally sentenced the offender to two
consecutive five-year sentences for the two § 924(c) violations, in
accordance with § 924(c)(1)(A). The judge changed the sentence,
however, after the government filed a memorandum requesting an
enhanced sentence for the second count. 32 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the application of the enhanced sentence provision of
§ 924(c)(1)(C) to multiple counts of carrying a firearm during a violent
or drug trafficking crime charged in the same indictment. 33 The court
in Rawlings thus interpreted the "second or subsequent conviction"
provision to include multiple § 924(c) convictions in a single
proceeding, allowing the enhanced sentence to be imposed for a
§ 924(c) violation committed prior to another § 924(c) conviction. The
court reasoned that the alternate interpretation "could defeat
Congress's intent to punish severely those who use firearms during
crimes of violence" and that such an interpretation might encourage
prosecutors to bring separate § 924(c) offenses in separate
indictments, allowing for the increased sentence while increasing
courts' caseloads.
34
This line of reasoning trickled into other circuits, interpreting
"second or subsequent conviction" to mean merely a finding of guilt
prior to sentencing.35 Three years after Rawlings, the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Foote adopted the Rawlings line of reasoning,
applying the enhanced sentence for a "second or subsequent
conviction" to a second count of possession of a firearm in the
commission of a drug trafficking offense. 36 In doing so, the court
29. 446 U.S. 398, 416 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
31. Id. at 1544.
32. Id. at 1544-45.
33. Id. at 1546.
34. Id. at 1546-47.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1990) (adopting the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Rawlings); United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 668 (8th
Cir. 1990) (same).
36. 898 F.2d at 668.
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affirmed the imposition of the enhanced sentence for a second § 924(c)
count in a single indictment. Referring to Rawlings, the court found
that "while the term 'subsequent' means 'following in time, order, or
place,' and implies that the second conviction must occur on a later
date than the first conviction, the term 'second' merely means 'another
or additional conviction,' and may apply to two convictions contained
in the same indictment."37 That same year, the Seventh Circuit also
adopted this interpretation in United States v. Bennett, holding that
"an offender is to receive an enhanced penalty for each offense which
is either 'second or subsequent,' regardless of whether the offenses are
charged in the same or in separate indictments." 38 Finding Rawlings
and Foote persuasive and the text of § 924(c) "clear and unambiguous,"
the appellate court affirmed the enhanced sentences. 39
During this same period of time, however, many courts were
continuing to apply multiple five-year sentences for multiple § 924(c)
convictions in a single indictment for first-time § 924(c) offenders. In
United States v. Fontanilla, the Ninth Circuit, finding two separate
underlying offenses, affirmed the imposition of two consecutive five-
year sentences for two § 924(c) convictions in a single prosecution.40
The Ninth Circuit again upheld multiple five-year sentences for
multiple § 924(c) violations in United States v. Jim. 41 The Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Henry stated that the government could
charge two separate counts under § 924(c) "because two separate
predicate offenses were charged," and the court affirmed the
imposition of two consecutive five-year sentences for the two § 924(c)
counts.42 The next year, that same court applied Henry in United
37. Id. (quoting Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1545).
38. 908 F.2d at 194. The two defendants in Bennett were found guilty by the jury of
committing a series of five bank robberies in Illinois. Id. at 192. The jury found one defendant
guilty of four counts of violating § 924(c); the other defendant was found guilty of five counts of
violating § 924(c). Id. The district court sentenced the defendants to five years' imprisonment for
the first § 924(c) convictions and applied the enhanced sentence, ten years at the time, for each
additional § 924(c) conviction in the case. Id. The § 924(c) counts totaled thirty-five years of one
defendant's thirty-eight year and four month sentence, and forty-five years of the other
defendant's fifty-year prison sentence. Id.
39. Id. at 194. Note that under the current sentences set out in the statute, the defendants
would be sentenced to eighty and 105 years on the § 924(c) charges alone.
40. 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1988).
41. 865 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming three consecutive five-year sentences for
three counts of use of a firearm in commission of a crime of violence relating to three counts of
assault on a federal officer with a deadly weapon).
42. 878 F.2d 937, 938, 942 (6th Cir. 1989). The court ultimately vacated one of the § 924(c)
counts, finding that the government failed to adequately connect the firearm to a separate drug
trafficking offense. Id. at 945.
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States v. Nabors, holding two separate predicate offenses were proven,
thus finding proper the two consecutive five-year sentences for
defendant's two § 924(c) convictions. 43 The Fourth Circuit also applied
§ 924(c) as a recidivist statute, affirming three consecutive five-year
sentences for three § 924(c) violations by a first-time offender in
United States v. Luskin.44 Nor did the Tenth Circuit challenge the trial
judge's imposition of two consecutive five-year sentences in United
States v. Chalan, though the court ultimately vacated the second
§ 924(c) count on other grounds.
45
Based on these disparate outcomes, it is clear that as of 1993,
the federal courts were far from resolute in their interpretations of
§ 924(c). Some district and appellate courts explicitly acknowledged
the reasonableness of competing strands of interpretation, recognizing
that "§ 924(c)(1) is, at best, hard to follow in simple English ... "46
and that "[t]he statute is not a model of clarity."47 In United States v.
Godwin, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied the recidivist
interpretation of the statute,48 but recognized contrary decisions 49 and
confusion as to the statute's proper application. 50 The court stated, "It
is unclear whether ['second or subsequent conviction'] means a second
time as a recidivist or a second time offender who has not faced
deterrence by a prior sentence."51  The twenty-seven-year-old
defendant in Godwin committed a series of robberies within two
weeks.5 12 The judge seemed to consider application of the enhanced
sentences under § 924(c)(1)(C) to be unnecessarily harsh, arguing that
"[i]f the sentence of 157 months in prison and three years supervised
release does not solve the problem... , it is difficult to see how
43. 901 F.2d 1351, 1357-59 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Nabor's two convictions under § 924(c)(1) do
not each require the same proof of facts; the two predicate offenses are distinct and require proof
of facts not required by the other predicate.').
44. 926 F.2d 372, 373, 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1991).
45. 812 F.2d 1302, 1315 (10th Cir. 1987). The court, however, ultimately found that the
defendant committed only one "crime of violence" and therefore only one § 924(c) violation. Id. at
1317 ("Chalan committed only a single 'crime of violence' for purposes of double jeopardy. The
conviction and sentence on the second section 924(c) charge must be vacated.") (footnote
omitted).
46. Nabors, 901 F.2d at 1358.
47. United States v. Godwin, 758 F. Supp. 281, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
48. Id. at 282 ("To the extent that I have discretion, I exercise it not to impose the
[enhanced § 924(c) sentence].").
49. Id. (acknowledging the Ninth Circuit's holding in Rawlings).
50. Id. at 283.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 282.
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another 15 years [due to an enhanced sentence under § 924(c)(1)(C)] at
the taxpayers' expense would help."
53
The tension caused by the competing strands of interpretation
was also emphasized by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Jones
and by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Abreu, both decided less
than one year before Deal v. United States.54 In Abreu, the Tenth
Circuit specifically held that the "second or subsequent conviction"
sentence did not apply to multiple § 924(c) counts in a single
indictment. 55 Recognizing that its position differed from that of other
circuits, the court found that "we simply cannot agree with those
courts that the language and legislative history unambiguously
demand the harsh construction those courts impose." 56 And while
precedent required the Eighth Circuit to uphold the defendants'
sentences in Jones, the court voiced concerns as to the effects of the
Eighth Circuit's previous interpretation of § 924(c). 57 One of the
defendants in Jones, twenty-four-year-old James Roulette, received a
five-year sentence for one count of violating § 924(c) and the enhanced
sentence, twenty years at the time of the case, for a second § 924(c)
count.58 The appellate court noted that the total sentence of forty-four
years and seven months "amounts to practically a life sentence"59 and
suggested that Roulette's sentence be reheard to reconsider the line of
interpretation previously adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Foote, as
this interpretation had led to "harsh" sentences.
60
The Jones court acknowledged that § 924(c) "might reasonably
be read to require that an offender be convicted of his first offense
before he commits the offense resulting in his 'second conviction.' "61
The court stated that "because [§ 924(c)] is ambiguous ... [it] should
be construed in favor of a defendant" and a "defendant should not be
penalized for a 'second conviction' unless he has already experienced a
53. Id.
54. United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1518 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Abreu,
962 F.2d 1447, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1992).
55. 962 F.2d at 1453-54.
56. Id. at 1453. The court found that the statutory language was ambiguous, that the
legislative history was unclear with respect to the "second or subsequent conviction" phrase, that
the rule of lenity applied, and that this interpretation was consistent with other subsequent
offender statutes, which generally did not apply sentence enhancements to multiple counts in a
single indictment. Id.
57. 965 F.2d at 1518.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1518-19.
61. Id. at 1518.
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first conviction when he committed the second offense."62 Looking at
the ordinary meanings of "second," "subsequent," and "conviction," the
court reasoned that § 924(c)(1)(C) "does not unambiguously lend itself
to the interpretation given ... in Foote and several other circuits."
63
The Eighth Circuit contended that the sparse legislative history
"illustrates that Congress did not closely examine other parts of the
federal criminal code before it acted," allowing for § 924(c) to be
interpreted like criminal statutes with similar language, which
require that the second offense be committed after a prior conviction
for an enhanced sentence to apply.64 The court concluded that
"punishing first offenders with twenty-five-year sentences does not
deter crime as much as it ruins lives."65 These cases immediately
preceding Deal illustrate that in the six years after the Rawlings
decision, district and appellate courts were by no means well settled
on the proper interpretation of § 924(c).
C. The Supreme Court Steps In
In May 1993, the Supreme Court addressed this interpretive
split in Deal v. United States, siding with the Rawlings line of
reasoning.66 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that
it is "unambiguous that 'conviction' refers to the finding of guilt by a
judge or jury that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment of
conviction."67 But like the lower courts, the Supreme Court Justices
also had a split in interpretation. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, issued a strong dissenting opinion,
contending that the "second or subsequent conviction" language
"clearly is intended to refer to a conviction for an offense committed
after an earlier conviction has become final."
68
At trial in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, a jury found defendant Thomas Deal guilty of
committing six armed bank robberies in the Houston area over the
course of four months in 1990.69 He was convicted of six counts of bank
robbery, six counts of carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of
62. Id. at 1519.
63. Id. at 1520.
64. Id. at 1521.
65. Id.
66. 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 141-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 130 (majority opinion).
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violence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 70
The district court imposed a five-year sentence for the first § 924(c)
count and five consecutive twenty-year sentences for each of the five
remaining § 924(c) counts,71 for a total sentence of 105 years for the
firearm counts alone. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this sentence.
72
The Supreme Court also upheld the district court's
interpretation and application of § 924(c), 73 finding "conviction" to
mean "a finding of guilt" preceding sentencing rather than a "final
judgment," which includes both a finding of guilt and sentencing. 74 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on a plain language
argument and a public policy argument, refused to apply the rule of
lenity, and critiqued the dissent. The majority acknowledged that
"conviction" can mean both "the finding of guilt" (which precedes
sentencing) or "final judgment" (which includes both the finding of
guilt and imposition of a sentence), 75 but found the plain language
reading of "conviction" to mean the former. 76 The majority looked to
the wording of the following section, § 924(c)(1)(D), as support for this
interpretation of "conviction," finding that both provisions are
"obviously meant to control the terms of a sentence yet to be
imposed."77 In terms of public policy, the majority expressed concern
that a contrary interpretation would create disparate sentencing
based on the prosecutor's choice to include multiple § 924(c) counts in
a single indictment or to charge and try the offender separately for
each violation in order to receive the enhanced second-time offender
sentence, a much more costly procedure, both in terms of time and
money. 78
70. Id.
71. Id. at 131.
72. United States v. Deal, 954 F.2d 262, 263 (5th Cir. 1992).
73. Deal, 508 U.S. at 137.
74. Id. at 133n.1.
75. Id. at 131.
76. Id. at 132.
77. Id. at 133. The content of § 924(c)(1)(D) at the time of the opinion read as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend
the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(D) (1993) (amended 1998)). The current version of § 924(c)(1)(D) contains similar
language. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D) (2006).
78. Deal, 508 U.S. at 133-34 ("[P]etitioner's reading would give a prosecutor unreviewable
discretion either to impose or to waive the enhanced sentencing provisions of § 924(c)(1) by




Finding no ambiguity in the wording of the statute, the
majority declined to apply the rule of lenity.79 The majority did not
find Deal's sentence to be "glaringly unjust," reasoning that an
offender should not be subject to multiple first-time offender sentences
"simply because he managed to evade detection, prosecution, and
conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six
in a single proceeding. °80 The majority also rejected the dissent's
argument that "subsequent offense" and "second or subsequent
conviction" convey analogous meanings, arguing that equating the two
phrases "requires a degree of verbal know-nothingism that would
render government by legislation quite impossible."8'
Justice Stevens's dissent, on the other hand, found "second or
subsequent conviction" to unambiguously mean both the finding of
guilt and imposition of a sentence, therefore applying § 924(c) as a
recidivist statute.8 2 The dissenting opinion asserted that, based on its
text, § 924(c) applies to recidivists only, and in the alternative, any
textual ambiguity requires application of the rule of lenity.8 3 Looking
at the text of the statute, the dissent found the phrases "second or
subsequent offense" and "second or subsequent conviction" to have
analogous meanings in this case,8 4 pointing out that "Congress
sometimes uses slightly different language to convey the same
message."8 5 Since Congress did not define "second or subsequent
conviction" in § 924(c) or during its passage, the dissent looked to the
application of other, similarly worded repeat offender statutes at the
time of § 924(c)'s enactment, finding a "long-established usage of the
word 'subsequent' to distinguish between first offenders and
recidivists."8 6 The lack of legislative history combined with this
common understanding at the time of § 924(c)'s passage, the dissent
reasoned, evidences Congress's intent to employ this familiar
interpretation.8 7
79. Id. at 137.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 135.
82. Id. at 141-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 141-43.
84. Id. at 137-38 ("Congress uses the terms 'subsequent offense,' 'second or subsequent
offense,' and 'second or subsequent conviction' in various sections of the Criminal Code, all to
authorize enhanced sentences for repeat offenders.") (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 137.
86. Id. at 138 (citing as an example United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir.
1978)).
87. Id. at 139 ("[lit is hardly surprising that Congressman Poff, who proposed the floor
amendment that became § 924(c), felt it unnecessary to elaborate further.").
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The dissent then called attention to the fact that this
understanding of "second or subsequent conviction" as a recidivist
provision was in fact consistently applied in reported cases by the
federal courts after the statute's passage.88 The dissent emphasized
that the majority's adopted interpretation did not surface until 1987,
nineteen years after the statute's passage,8 9 which does not comport
with the majority's characterization of this interpretation as having
"utterly no ambiguity."90 This alternative interpretation, the dissent
stated, replaced common sense based on historical context with strict
textualism, requiring "an elaborate exercise in sentence parsing."91
Like the majority, the dissent found the meaning of § 924(c)(1)(C)
unambiguous, 92 but arrived at an opposite interpretation: "Like its
many counterparts in the Criminal Code, the phrase clearly is
intended to refer to a conviction for an offense committed after an
earlier conviction has become final; it is, in short, a recidivist
provision."93 Arguing in the alternative, the dissent contended that if
ambiguity was found in the language of § 924(c), the rule of lenity
should be applied, resulting in the same recidivist interpretation.
94
III. ANALYSIS: WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL?
The Deal decision has not been accepted and applied by the
lower courts without criticism, and the subsequent application of
§ 924(c) has resulted in many unjustly long prison sentences for first-
time offenders. 95 Section 924(c) requires reexamination in light of
lower courts' criticism of the staggering consequences of Deal, the tools
88. Id. at 139-41.
89. Id. at 140-41 (referring to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Rawlings,
821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987), and concluding that it is "quite likely that until 1987, the
Government read the 'second or subsequent' section of § 924(c) as a straightforward recidivist
provision").
90. Id. at 142 n.6 (citing id. at 135 (majority opinion)).
91. Id. at 146.
92. Id. at 141 ("I would find no ambiguity in the phrase 'subsequent conviction' as used in
§ 924(c).").
93. Id. at 141-42.
94. Id. at 143 ("[This equivocation on the part of those charged with enforcing § 924(c),
combined with the understanding of repeat offender provisions current when § 924(c) was
enacted, render the construction of § 924(c) sufficiently uncertain that the rule of lenity should
apply.').
95. E.g., United States v. Jefferson, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301-03 (M.D. Ala. 2004) ("This
court is aware that the sentence it must give Jefferson is unjust .... However, this court is
bound by the Supreme Court's holding that the term 'subsequent conviction,' as used in
[§ 924(c)], means a finding of guilt by a judge or jury....').
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of statutory construction, the purposes of criminal punishment, and
the trend toward increased judicial sentencing discretion. These
analyses all support an understanding of "second or subsequent
conviction" as a reference to an offense committed after a previous
conviction and indicate that either Congress should rewrite
§ 924(c)(1)(C) to clarify it as a true recidivist provision or the Supreme
Court should overturn Deal.
A. The Deal Decision and Its Criticism
The Court's 1993 ruling in United States v. Deal is binding on
all lower federal courts, but several lower courts have voiced
reluctance and discomfort with following this precedent, including
courts in the Second, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. This
discomfort evidences a need for either Congress or the Supreme Court
to address the potentially unjust results of the Deal holding for many
offenders. Applying the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 924(c) has
led to severe and unjust sentences for offenders, as the precedent
requires imposition of the enhanced sentence without providing notice
to the offender of the much larger penalty for multiple § 924(c) counts.
The most open criticism of the Deal decision has been made at
the district court level by the judges forced to impose the enhanced
mandatory minimum sentence. In United States v. Angelos, Judge
Paul Cassell of the District of Utah articulated at the beginning of the
opinion that "to sentence Mr. Angelos to prison for the rest of his life
[due to the required imposition of fifty-five years' imprisonment for
three § 924(c) counts] is unjust, cruel, and even irrational. '96 Judge
Cassell expressly called on both President George W. Bush to
commute the sentence to "no more than 18 years in prison" and
Congress to amend § 924(c) "so that its harsh provisions for 25-year
multiple sentences apply only to true recidivist ... offenders."
97
The defendant, twenty-four-year-old first-time offender Weldon
Angelos, was convicted of three § 924(c) counts related to two $350
controlled buys of marijuana from a government agent and handguns
found in his home pursuant to a search warrant. 98 The Guidelines'
sentence for all but the § 924(c) counts-thirteen other counts for the
96. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004), affd, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
97. Id. at 1230-31.
98. Id. at 1231-32. A controlled buy is the purchase of controlled substances made by an
informant or undercover police officer while under the observation and control of police officers.
[Vol. 64:3:10051020
GIVING IT ANOTHER SHOT
drug deals and related offenses-totaled seventy-eight to ninety-seven
months, or six years and six months to eight years and one month.99
Criticizing the current interpretation of § 924(c) as "blindly
draw[ing] no distinction between recidivists and first-time
offenders,"'100 the district judge "reluctantly" concluded that, because of
Deal, the court must impose a fifty-five-year sentence for the three
§ 924(c) counts-five years for the first count and twenty-five years
each for the second and third counts. 10 1 The court emphasized that
"[i]f Angelos serves his full 61 1/2-year sentence, he will be 85 years
old upon release" and that "the earliest possible release date for Mr.
Angelos [is] at 77 years of age" because of a fifteen percent reduction
for good behavior.
10 2
To emphasize the severity of the interpretation, the district
court compared Angelos's mandatory sentence with those of other
federal crimes, finding that "the classifications created by § 924(c) are
simply irrational."'1 3 The comparisons showed that the defendant's
§ 924(c) sentence alone is longer than sentences for offenders
convicted of "three aircraft hijackings, three second-degree murders,
three kidnappings, or three rapes," even though Angelos's offenses
were certainly less serious than even a single count of any of these
crimes. 104
The court found that the Sentencing Guidelines were at odds
with the mandatory minimum of § 924(c), pointing out that the
maximum sentence increase under the Guidelines for three counts of
possessing a firearm in relation to a drug offense is two years, as
opposed to the fifty-five-year enhancement under § 924(c)(1)(C). 10 5 The
opinion emphasized that § 924(c) requires punishment "far beyond"
that recommended by the United States Sentencing Commission, an
99. Id. at 1232.
100. Id. at 1250.
101. Id. at 1230.
102. Id. at 1239.
103. Id. at 1244.
104. Id. at 1246. The three § 924(c) counts mandate a sentence of 660 months, while a three-
time aircraft hijacker's sentence under the Guidelines, for example, would total 405 months; the
sentence of a terrorist who detonates three bombs in public places with intent to kill-293
months; a kidnapper of three persons-
2 10 months; a rapist of three ten-year-old children-188
months; and a racist who attacks three minorities with intent to kill-151 months. Though it is
arguable that Congress's policy intent was to utilize severe sentences for crimes with firearms as
a tool to deter crime, the ultimate sentencing result for § 924(c) offenders can be unjust when
compared to the sentences for these other crimes.
105. Id. at 1241.
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expert sentencing agency established by Congress to provide annually
amended guideline sentence ranges for federal criminal offenses.
10 6
Due to its disagreement and discomfort with the current
interpretation of § 924(c), the court ultimately sentenced Angelos to
fifty-five years and one day, "the minimum that the law allows."10 7 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence, 08 and the Supreme Court denied
Angelos's petition for a writ of certiorari.109 Angelos's attorneys
petitioned President George W. Bush for a sentence reduction, 10 but
the President took no action.
In United States v. Jefferson, the Middle District of Alabama
also found that imposing an enhanced sentence under § 924(c) was
"unjust."'' Defendant Wendell Jefferson was convicted of six offenses,
including two drug trafficking offenses and two § 924(c) offenses.
112
After three months of investigation, police found cocaine when they
searched Jefferson's car, which was parked outside of his wife's
business, and found a firearm inside his wife's business along with
cocaine residue." 3 In addition, police searched Jefferson's home,
finding both cocaine and firearms there. 1 4 After ordering a recess
from sentencing to research whether the second § 924(c) count should
trigger the enhanced sentence for a "second or subsequent
conviction, ' 15 the district court reluctantly held that, due the
Supreme Court's decision in Deal,116 the second count required
application of the enhanced § 924(c)(1)(C) sentence. This application of
Deal resulted in a thirty-year sentence for the firearm possession
charges alone.
1 7
Though the two violations of § 924(c) were committed
concurrently, the court found that Deal demanded that one be
106. Id. at 1240, 1243.
107. Id. at 1230.
108. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 754 (10th Cir. 2006).
109. Angelos v. United States, 549 U.S. 1077, 1077 (2006).
110. Convicted Drug Dealer Asks for Presidential Clemency, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 15, 2009.
111. 302 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
112. Id. at 1296 (pleading guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute).
113. Id. at 1297.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1296.
116. Id. at 1298.
117. Id. at 1297.
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punished more severely than the other.118  The district court
emphasized that this decision had "serious consequences for Jefferson"
and that a "tension... exists between the court's obligation to apply
the law and its inability, in this case, to defend the justness of the
result."119 The court asserted that the current application of this
sentencing statute failed to "bear a rational relationship to the
defendant's crime." 120 "The underlying policy rationale for applying
the enhanced sentences in Deal [the increased culpability of an
offender who commits multiple offenses because he is not caught]
simply does not make sense when applied to Jefferson's case," the
court reasoned, because Jefferson's offenses were simultaneous. 12 1 The
court pointed out that although he is less blameworthy than an
individual storing many drugs and firearms in one location or an
individual who uses firearms multiple times in relation to one
underlying conspiracy, he must serve a longer sentence than those
individuals merely because he stored his firearms in different
locations.
122
In a similar post-Deal case, the Middle District of Alabama was
again loath to impose the enhanced sentence for a second § 924(c)
count.123 In United States v. Washington, a twenty-two-year-old
defendant with no criminal history was sentenced to more than forty
years in prison; thirty of these years were for two counts of violating
§ 924(c). 124 The district court emphasized the harshness of this
sentence:
If [the defendant] gets time off for good conduct, he will be in prison until he is in his
late 50s and, if he serves the entire sentence, until he is 62.... [FIrom the point of view
of a 22-year old, 40 years is essentially a life sentence. Society generally reserves such
harsh sentences for its most dangerous or incorrigible offenders, such as murderers and
career offenders .... 125
Appellate courts have voiced similar reluctance to applying
Deal. In 1996, three years after Deal, the Ninth Circuit in United
118. Id. ("[This court holds that it is required to treat one of Jefferson's § 924(c) convictions
as subsequent to the other, and therefore apply an enhanced sentence, even though the two
violations were committed simultaneously.").
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1302.
121. Id. at 1301.
122. Id. at 1301-02.
123. United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1306-07 (M.D. Ala. 2004) ("[IThe
court had no choice but to sentence Washington to 30 years on these two counts, for a total term
of more than 40 years.").
124. Id. at 1306-07, 1309.
125. Id. at 1308-09.
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States v. Andrews commented that "[a]lthough there is much force to
[defendant's] policy argument, it does not permit us to avoid the
import of the Supreme Court's unambiguous definition of 'second or
subsequent conviction' in Deal."'126 The defendant had argued that
Deal was distinguishable "because in Deal the underlying predicate
offenses occurred over a long period of time," while in the present case
"the underlying predicate offenses occurred virtually
simultaneously."' 127 A jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree
murder, aiding and abetting second-degree murder, two counts of
attempted voluntary manslaughter, and four counts of use of a firearm
in relation to a crime of violence, all stemming from a single criminal
episode. 128 The defendant reasoned that the current application of the
enhanced penalty for repeat offenders "makes no sense... where
there was no time for [the offender] to reflect and understand the
consequences of enhanced penalties for the 'subsequent' offenses.
129
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant's argument but affirmed
the district court's sentence, holding that Deal's interpretations
"require" the rejection of the defendant's arguments and the
imposition of enhanced sentences for the second, third, and fourth
§ 924(c) counts. 130
The Third Circuit in United States v. Casiano was also forced
to apply the twenty-five-year sentence of § 924(c)(1)(C), even though
the subsequent offense was part of a single criminal episode.1 3' The
defendants pled guilty to carjacking, kidnapping, and two counts of
possession of a firearm in relation to a violent crime.132 The
defendants challenged the imposition of an enhanced sentence for the
second § 924(c) count, arguing that the carjacking and kidnapping
constitute a single, continuous episode of criminal conduct and
therefore the second § 924(c) offense should not constitute a "second or
subsequent conviction" triggering the enhanced twenty-five-year
sentence. 133 The Third Circuit upheld the sentence, holding that
"[a]lthough there may be some force in defendants' argument that the
enhanced penalty under § 924(c)(1) serves little purpose in a case
126. 75 F.3d 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1996).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 554-55.
129. Id. at 558.
130. Id.
131. 113 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1997).
132. Id. at 423.
133. Id. at 424.
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where the predicate acts occur simultaneously,"' 134 "the language and
reasoning of Deal ineluctably require rejection of this argument."
135
Thus, the court applied the Deal interpretation of "conviction" as a
finding of guilt, even though "there [was] not time for defendants to
reflect and understand the consequences of a 'second' conviction."'
136
The Second Circuit, too, has voiced apprehension about the
potentially drastic outcomes resulting from the Deal interpretation of
§ 924(c). In United States v. Zhou, the Second Circuit was required
under Deal to affirm the application of the enhanced sentence of
§ 924(c)(1)(C) to multiple § 924(c) counts in a single indictment
relating to a single crime spree. 137 While the defendants only raised an
issue with the interpretation of § 924(c) to preserve it for further
review at the Supreme Court level, conceding that the appellate court
must apply Deal, 38 the Second Circuit openly noted that "the
potentially staggering implications of the Deal holding are well-
illustrated in the case."'
1 39
The criticisms in these cases reveal the lower courts'
continuing discomfort with the current interpretation and resulting
application of § 924(c). The Supreme Court's interpretation of this
mandatory sentencing provision has required judges to impose unduly
severe prison sentences on offenders with multiple § 924(c) counts in a
single prosecution, relegating first-time offenders to de facto life
sentences while three-time rapists, for example, receive only 121
months' imprisonment. 140 Some of these post-Deal cases have not only
voiced their disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
"second or subsequent conviction," but have gone so far as to urge
either that Congress clarify this section of the statute as a recidivist
provision or that the Supreme Court reconsider the current binding
definition of "conviction" in the ambiguous context of § 924(c). 41 This
134. Id. at 426.
135. Id. at 425.
136. Id. at 426.
137. 428 F.3d 361, 368-69 (2d Cir. 2005). A jury found the defendants guilty of a series of
robberies and related crimes over a six-month period. Id. at 368. Following Dears definition of
"conviction," the district court imposed three consecutive twenty-five-year sentences for the
second, third, and fourth counts of § 924(c) violations. Id. at 369 n.5.
138. Id. at 369 n.6.
139. Id. at 369 n.5.
140. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1246 tbl.2 (D. Utah 2004), affd,
433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006) (listing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' sentence for federal
crimes committed three times).
141. E.g., id. at 1230-31; United States v. Jefferson, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301-03 (M.D.
Ala. 2004) ('This court believes the statutory language is ambiguous, at best, as to Congress's
intent. If this were a matter of first impression, this court would be guided by the rule of
20111 1025
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ongoing reluctance by the district and appellate courts demonstrates a
need for either Congress or the Supreme Court to address the unjust
results of the Deal holding for many offenders.
B. Theories and Tools of Statutory Interpretation
Courts have a variety of theories and tools on hand when
interpreting the meaning of a statute. Three main theories exist:
textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. 142 These theories each
support the interpretation of § 924(c) as a purely recidivist statute,
requiring the enhanced § 924(c)(1)(C) sentence only for offenses
committed after a previous conviction. Moreover, if none of these
interpretive theories is found to provide a clear answer as to the
proper interpretation of "second or subsequent conviction," then courts
should employ the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity, a tool of statutory
construction "regularly affirmed" by the Supreme Court for decades,
143
also supports a recidivist interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(C).
Intentionalism focuses on both the statute's language and its
legislative history, while purposivism looks to the broader social
purpose that Congress sought to achieve through the statute, often
applying it to unforeseen contemporary circumstances. 1 Textualism,
on the other hand, seeks to ascertain a statute's meaning not through
the writers' intent, but through the words of the statute itself.
1 45
These different theories of statutory interpretation can and have been
used to try to elucidate the meaning of the text of § 924(c). The rule of
lenity, as stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bass, finds
that "where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are
resolved in favor of the defendant."'146 Courts have applied the rule of
lenity to criminal sentencing, including § 924(c). 147
1. Textualism
The majority opinion in Deal, written by Justice Scalia, found
the "second or subsequent conviction" language of § 924(c) to have
lenity.... If application of the Supreme Court's holding produces anomalous and objectionable
results, Congress may always amend the statute or the Supreme Court may reconsider.').
142. Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Precedent, 34
ARIz. ST. L.J. 815, 818 (2002).
143. Apostolides, supra note 16, at 1016.
144. Mank, supra note 142, at 818-19.
145. Id. at 819.
146. 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
147. Apostolides, supra note 16, at 1016-17.
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"utterly no ambiguity,"148 basing the holding on the text of the statute.
However, the discord between the majority and dissenting opinions, as
well as among lower federal courts prior to Deal, provides a sound
argument for ambiguity, and the majority's textualist tools are
therefore arguably flawed.
Both the majority and dissent determined that the statutory
text provided an unambiguous interpretation of "second or subsequent
conviction," but with opposite outcomes. This result directly opposes
the notion that the text of the statute clearly shows the meaning of
"second or subsequent conviction," because if the meaning were clear,
then the Court would not have been so sharply divided. Lower courts'
clashing interpretations of § 924(c)(1)(C)'s "second or subsequent
conviction" from at least 1987149 to 1993150 further evince this
interpretive uncertainty.
The Deal majority looked narrowly to the "context of
§ 924(c)(1)" itself and found that "if 'conviction' in § 924(c)(1) meant
'judgment of conviction,' the provision would be incoherent" because
the statute would prescribe a sentence longer than one already
imposed.151 The majority also found a distinction between "offense"
and "conviction," arguing that § 924(c) "does not use the term 'offense,'
so it cannot possibly be said that it requires a criminal act after the
first conviction. What it requires is a conviction after the first
conviction."1
52
The Deal majority briefly employed another popular textualist
technique 153 by looking to dictionary definitions of the statute's key
words to determine their plain meanings. 154 But the majority
acknowledged that "conviction" can be defined either as "the finding of
guilt" or "the entry of a final judgment on that finding."155 Many
dictionaries exist, and each typically has multiple definitions for a
148. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993).
149. This is the year of the Eleventh Circuit's Rawlings decision, interpreting "conviction" to
mean a finding of guilt, not final judgment, in the context of § 924(c)(1)(C). 821 F.2d 1543, 1545
(11th Cir. 1987).
150. This is the year of the Supreme Court's Deal decision. 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
151. Id. at 132.
152. Id. at 135.
153. Mank, supra note 142, at 828 ("Textualists often use the dictionary as the principal
means for understanding the so-called 'ordinary' meaning of statutory terms."); Note, Looking It
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1994) (observing
that "courts have long used dictionaries to aid in their interpretive endeavors" and "[i]n recent
years, the Court has come to rely on dictionaries to an unprecedented degree").
154. Deal, 508 U.S. at 131-32 (citing Webster's New International Dictionary and Black's
Law Dictionary).
155. Id. at 131.
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term, undermining the argument that a particular definition in a
particular dictionary provides the "ordinary meaning" of a term.
156
The Supreme Court has failed to consistently cite one dictionary or to
give justifications for the dictionary used, 157 further weakening the
persuasiveness of the results generated by this technique. In addition,
dictionaries cannot take into account the statute's context. 158 Thus,
the use of a dictionary definition to determine the ordinary meaning of
a "conviction" is insufficient both in theory and in practice.
2. Intentionalism and Purposivism
Courts often look to the legislative history of a statute to help
clarify its intent and purpose, hoping to shed light on the proper
construction and application of its terms. With regard to § 924(c),
however, the legislative history accompanying the text of the statute is
both deficient and vague. 159 Congress did not elaborate on the
intended interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(C)'s enhanced sentence for a
"second or subsequent conviction." As evidenced by the federal courts'
later split in interpretation, 160 the relevant legislative history is less
than clear when seeking to understand the meaning of the "second or
subsequent conviction" language of § 924(c)(1)(C).
As the statute's text and legislative history do not clearly
evince the meaning of "second or subsequent conviction," another
salient method for attempting to uncover Congress's purpose and
intent behind the words in § 924(c) is to look to the broader context in
which the statute was enacted. 161 As the Supreme Court explained in
156. Note, supra note 153, at 1445 ('There are a wide variety of dictionaries from which to
choose, and all of them usually provide several entries for each word.... If multiple definitions
are available, which one best fits the way an ordinary person would interpret the term?").
157. Id. at 1448.
158. Id. at 1449-50.
159. The Congressmen pushing for the adoption of § 924(c) only commented, for example,
that the statute was meant "[t]o persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to
leave his gun at home," United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1520 (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
22,231 (1968)), and that the statute should be implemented so "[a]ny person who commits a
crime and uses a gun will know that he cannot get out of serving a penalty in jail," id. (quoting
114 CONG. REC. 22,237 (1968)).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming the
application multiple concurrent § 924(c)(1)(A) sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions in a
single indictment and implicitly defining "conviction" as final judgment); United States v.
Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987) (defining "conviction" as a finding of guilt
preceding final judgment and allowing for a second § 924(c) count in a single indictment to
trigger the enhanced sentence of § 924(c)(1)(C)).
161. Mank, supra note 142, at 830 ("Most modern commentators maintain that words do not
have a single, clear meaning, but rather that a word's meaning changes based on context.").
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National Labor Relations Board v. Amax Coal Co., "[w]here Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning... , a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms."162 This is
accomplished by looking at the meaning of the terms at the time the
statute was enacted. 163 In this case, the interpretation of other repeat
offender statutes is highly relevant. Around the time of the passage of
the Gun Control Act of 1968, the federal circuit courts interpreted
statutes imposing enhanced sentences for second or subsequent
offenses as recidivist statutes, applying the increased penalties for
offenses only committed after conviction for the first offense. 164 As far
back as 1922, the Third Circuit interpreted repeat offender statutes
with enhanced penalties for "a second or subsequent offense" to mean
that a second offense could only occur after conviction for a first
offense. 1
65
Closer to the statute's date of enactment, the First Circuit
interpreted a statute requiring enhanced sentences for second and
subsequent narcotics law violations to apply only to narcotics offenses
occurring after conviction of a prior narcotics offense, not to two or
more narcotics offenses in a single prosecution. 166 In deciding the case,
the court looked to judicial interpretation of other repeat offender
sentencing statutes, observing that "[m]ost subsequent offender
statutes have been construed ... so that any offense committed
subsequent to a conviction calls for the increased penalty.' 67
The Seventh Circuit similarly construed a repeat offender
statute after the passage of § 924(c).168 The statute at issue
criminalized robbery of a postal worker of mail or money, imposing an
enhanced sentence for a "subsequent offense."' 69 To determine the
applicability of the enhanced sentence provision, the court looked to
the legislative history of the statute, finding that the enacting
162. 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (citation omitted).
163. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (looking to the development and
evolution of the common law definition to define the term "bribery").
164. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e hold that the
twenty-five year sentence ... for a second offense applies only to an offense occurring subsequent
to conviction for a first offense."); Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1955)
("[W]e hold that the subsequent offender provision of the Act of November 2, 1951, applies only
to narcotics offenders who commit subsequent offenses after convictions.").
165. Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 419-20 (3d Cir. 1922).
166. Gonzalez, 224 F.2d at 433-35.
167. Id. at 434.
168. Cooper, 580 F.2d at 263.
169. Id. at 260 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2114).
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senators "equated 'offense' with 'convicted' of an offense, and that this
apparently was clearly understood, since other senators participating
in the debate.., gave no contrary indication."'170 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit found that the enhanced sentence for a "subsequent offense"
only applied to an offense committed after conviction of the first
offense under the statute.
171
Though these repeat offender statutes were worded in terms of
"offenses" rather than "convictions," both have been understood in
terms of convictions. Given this general understanding of repeat
offender statutes, both before and after the passage of § 924(c), it is
unsurprising that no further elaboration was given as to the meaning
of "second or subsequent conviction" during the passage of, or in the
text of, § 924(c). As articulated by the Supreme Court in Morissette v.
United States, when the legislature includes terms that have been
interpreted consistently in the past, it presumably adopts this well-
known meaning "unless otherwise instructed."'172 The Court continued,
"[A]bsence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with
widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them."'173 The
enacting legislator's articulated purpose of § 924(c)(1)(C) is the same
as that of other enhanced sentences for repeat offenders: "if he does so
a second time, he is going to jail for a longer time."174 Thus, a
reasonable inference in light of the consistent history of interpretation
of repeat offender statutes, coupled with a lack of legislative history
accompanying this statute, is to interpret "second or subsequent
conviction" in § 924(c) in the same way as the settled usage of "second
offense" in other repeat offender statutes.
3. The Rule of Lenity
When ambiguity is present in a criminal statute's text, courts
may employ the rule of lenity, 175 which calls for ambiguous criminal
statutes to be construed leniently toward defendants. 176 In practice,
when following the rule of lenity, "the Court will not interpret a
170. Id. at 263.
171. Id.
172. 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
173. Id.
174. United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1520 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
22,231 (1968)).
175. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 143 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that § 924(c) is sufficiently ambiguous to invoke the rule of lenity).
176. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (citing Ladner v. United States, 358
U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
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federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on
an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended."177 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Bass identified two rationales behind the rule of
lenity.178 First, " 'a fair warning should be given [to offenders] ... of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' "179 Second,
"because of the seriousness of criminal penalties,... legislatures and
not courts should define criminal activity."
180
Prior to Deal the Supreme Court and appellate courts had
applied the rule of lenity to § 924(c)(1). 181 The Supreme Court
articulated a standard for determining when courts should employ the
rule of lenity three years before deciding Deal.18 2 In Moskal v. United
States, the Court found that a statute is ambiguous, and the rule of
lenity therefore applies, when "reasonable doubt persists about a
statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of the
statute."18 3
Looking to the language and structure of the statute, "[a]n
analysis of the textual arguments made by the majority and the
dissent.., reveals that the language of § 924(c) is ambiguous under
Moskal's 'reasonable doubt' standard."18 4 The majority examined
"second or subsequent conviction" within the context of § 924(c) itself,
while the dissent looked outside of the statute, interpreting the
language in light of repeat offender statutes. Because neither of these
techniques is invalid, the "reasonable doubt" standard is met. 8 5 As
explained above, the legislative history is sparse and fails to address
the meaning behind "second or subsequent conviction."'1 6 Thus, the
legislative history does not resolve the "reasonable doubt" about the
statute's intended scope, and the rule of lenity should apply. Finally,
public policy considerations "do not clearly dictate either a broad or
narrow reading of the statute."'1 7 Thus, the meaning of "second or
177. Ladner, 358 U.S. at 178.
178. 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
179. Id. (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
180. Id.
181. Apostolides, supra note 16, at 1017.
182. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
183. Id. (citing Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)) (emphasis in original).
184. Apostolides, supra note 16, at 1032.
185. Id.
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. See Apostolides, supra note 16, at 1038-39 (finding the public policy interests in favor
of the Deal majority's construction of "second or subsequent conviction" to be an interest in
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subsequent conviction" should be found to be ambiguous, and courts
should apply the rule of lenity.
Employing the rule of lenity in this case, "conviction" should
mean both the finding of guilt and sentencing, so that a first-time
offender with multiple § 924(c) counts would be sentenced to multiple
§ 924(c)(1)(A) sentences. The rule of lenity would prevent
understanding "conviction" as only a finding of guilt, which results in
a single § 924(c)(1)(A) sentence for a criminal defendant and enhanced
§ 924(c)(1)(C) sentences for additional counts in a single prosecution,
because this latter interpretation leads to much longer sentences and
the rule of lenity requires ambiguous statutes to be construed
leniently toward defendants.
These interpretive theories and tools all suggest that the
language of § 924(c)(1)(C) was intended to, and should be understood
as, an enhanced sentence provision applicable to recidivists-those
who commit and are convicted of another violation only after
conviction for a first offense.
C. Purposes of Criminal Punishment
None of the prevailing purposes of criminal punishment
supports Deal's interpretation of § 924(c). Just as there are many
perspectives on how to interpret a statute, there are many
perspectives on how to shape the type and length of punishment for an
offense. These include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.1 88 Congress has articulated each of these theories of
punishment as a relevant consideration in shaping a criminal
sentence, instructing courts to consider the need "to provide just
punishment for the offense," "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct," "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,"
and "to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner."189
"being 'tough on crime' " and an interest in judicial economy, and finding the public policy
interests in favor of the dissent's construction to be an interest in all people having "a clear
understanding of the probable legal response to their acts" and an interest in placing the power
to define criminal offenses in the legislature).
188. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 87-91 (2d ed.
2008) (explaining the criteria of the retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation
justifications for criminal punishment).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
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1. Retribution
Retribution is not justly served by applying the twenty-five-
year enhanced sentence of § 924(c)(1)(C) to non-recidivists. The
retributive approach, also called the "just deserts" theory, seeks just
punishment by sentencing offenders proportionately to the seriousness
of their actual criminal behavior. 190 This approach is society-oriented,
as the seriousness of the offense is shaped by society's perceptions of
dangerousness and justice. 191 It is true that a repeated offense can
seem more reprehensible than a first violation was, 192 especially if the
offender has consciously "managed to evade detection, prosecution,
and conviction" for previous offenses for a period of time, which was a
concern of the Deal majority.1 93 Sentencing guidelines and statutes
recognize this increased blameworthiness by imposing increased
sentences for repeat offenders.1 94 As Professor Paul Robinson
observed, "[H]abitual-offender statutes commonly double, triple, or
quadruple the punishment imposed upon a repeat offender" for the
offender" 'thumbing his nose' at the system."195
But Congress has imposed an even higher ratio in § 924(c),
mandating a sentence five times greater than that for a first-time
firearm possession violation.196 While repeating a § 924(c) offense may
justify some increased punishment, it does not seem to single-
handedly justify a sentence five times longer than that of the first
offense.' 97 Robinson finds that "a nose-thumbing increase can hardly
justify the doubling, tripling, or quadrupling of the punishments."
'1 98
Increasing the sentence five-fold is even more egregious and
undeserved.
190. ROBINSON, supra note 188, at 90.
191. Id.
192. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Rlusions, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 287, 313 (2001) ('By committing another offense after having been previously
convicted, an offender might be seen as 'thumbing his nose' at the system, and such nose-
thumbing may justify some incremental punishment over what a first offense would deserve.').
193. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 137 (1993).
194. See Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 433 (1st Cir. 1955) ("[Ihe Supreme Court
has recognized the ... retribution theor[y] of punishment as [a] primary reason[ ] for imposing
greater penalties on the repeater.").
195. Robinson, supra note 192, at 313.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (requiring a sentence of at least five years for the first
violation and a sentence of at least twenty-five years for a "second or subsequent conviction").
197. See Robinson, supra note 192, at 314 ("[T]he nose-thumbing is only one of many
characteristics of the second [offense] that influences its blameworthiness.").
198. Id. at 313.
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Some criminal law scholars find that recidivism should not
enhance an offender's sentence at all, as it is undeserved punishment.
Professor Stephen Morse argues, "Recidivism does not make the last
crime worse and more culpable in itself than if it had been the agent's
first offense. It simply indicates that the agent is a worse and more
dangerous person, but... it is not a crime to be a bad, dangerous
agent."199 A repeat offender has already been fully punished for prior
offenses, as sentences were imposed and served by the offender for
those offenses. 200 Morse contends that "[e]nhanced sentencing for
recidivists is a form of pure preventative detention" and thus
"retributively unfair."201 Robinson echoes this sentiment, finding that
in the case of repeat offenders, the "initial portion of an imprisonment
sentence may well be deserved, but is followed by a purely
preventative detention portion that cannot be justified as deserved
punishment."20 2 Furthermore, in the eyes of the victim, the
seriousness of an offense stems from the offender's conduct in that
instance, not from the fact that the offender had engaged in the
conduct before, 203 nor from multiple violations in a single criminal
episode.
In addition, a multiple, single-episode offender is generally
considered less blameworthy than a recidivist who has served a
punishment, knows the consequences of another offense, and
nonetheless chooses to violate § 924(c) again. Under the statute's
interpretation in Deal, however, these two types of offenders would
receive the same punishment for an additional § 924(c) violation. The
application of the enhanced sentence to multiple § 924(c) counts in a
single indictment can easily turn punishment into "essentially a life
sentence," which is normally set aside for the most serious and
dangerous crimes. 20 4 From a retributivist's perspective, therefore, the
current application of § 924(c)(1)(C) is grossly disproportionate to the
seriousness and blameworthiness of the conduct at issue.
199. Stephen J. Morse, Preventative Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS, Spring 2004, at 56, 66.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Robinson, supra note 192, at 313.
203. See id. at 314 ('The victim, for example, is offended by the robbery itself, not by the fact
that it was a second-timer who performed it.').
204. United States v. Jefferson, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004)).
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2. Deterrence
The deterrence theory of punishment also fails to support the
interpretation of § 924(c) as set forth in Deal. Deterrence theory seeks
to impose sentences that will deter both the individual offender and
potential offenders from committing the offense in the future, 20 5 in this
case possession of a firearm during a violent crime or drug trafficking
offense. To effectively deter future criminal behavior, a potential
offender must have notice of the consequences of criminal offenses.
The public, however, generally does not know the specific
consequences of certain criminal behavior. For example, it is not
generally commonly known that possession of a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence is a separate offense
punishable by between five and twenty-five years. Imposing the
enhanced § 924(c)(1)(C) sentence for multiple § 924(c) counts in a
single indictment does not provide notice to an offender of the severe
enhancement for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug crime or
crime of violence. In contrast, applying the enhanced sentence only for
offenses committed after a previous § 924(c) conviction would provide
an offender with clear notice that a future § 924(c) offense will carry a
heavier punishment.
While a long sentence for possession or use of a firearm during
a crime could deter future behavior by the offender or other potential
offenders, the Deal dissent reasoned that "punishing first offenders
with twenty-five-year sentences does not deter crime as much as it
ruins lives."20 6 Imposition of the enhanced § 924(c)(1)(C) sentence
often creates de facto life sentences, giving no opportunity for the
offender to be deterred in the future. Given the possible severity of the
enhanced sentence under § 924(c) and the public's general lack of
knowledge as to the specific provisions of criminal statutes, deterring
future criminal behavior of the individual offender might be more
effective if the enhanced sentence is applied to offenders who commit
the "second or subsequent" violation only after a previous conviction.
As the Deal dissent explains:
If, after arrest and conviction, a first offender is warned that he will face a mandatory
[enhanced] sentence if he commits the same crime again, then the offender will know of
the penalty. Having already served at least five years in prison, he will have a strong
incentive to stay out of trouble. Discouraging recidivism by people who have already
205. ROBINSON, supra note 188, at 88.
206. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 146 n.10 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1521 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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been in prison and been released serves a far more valuable purpose than deterring
offenders who have yet to be arrested and have no knowledge of the law's penalties.
20 7
Thus, even the deterrence theory of punishment can find the
application of enhanced sentences for multiple § 924(c) counts in a
single indictment to be troublesome and ineffective. As a recidivist
provision, however, it would enable the offender to have notice of the
increased penalties for a subsequent violation of § 924(c) and to have
the opportunity to be deterred from committing future offenses.
3. Incapacitation
Incapacitation theory is more nuanced than simply seeking to
imprison all offenders for the longest time possible under the law, and
as such, this theory also runs counter to § 924(c) as interpreted in
Deal. Punishment focused on incapacitation seeks to keep dangerous
persons away from society to prevent the commission of further
offenses.2 08 While at first glance this rationale seems to support the
imposition of severe sentences to keep criminals locked away, the
theory dictates that the dangerousness of the offender, as established
by the conviction or convictions, determines the appropriate length of
incapacitation. 20 9 The conduct of an offender possessing a firearm who
commits two offenses is not necessarily more dangerous than, for
example, an offender who committed a single offense with multiple
firearms. The first offender, however, would receive a thirty-year
sentence on the firearm counts, while the second offender, though
carrying more firearms, would receive only a five-year sentence.
Similarly, an offender who commits an offense after conviction
of a prior offense is more dangerous than an offender who commits
multiple offenses before indictment and conviction, as the first
offender has notice of the increased penalty for his actions and
commits an offense anyway, ignoring known consequences and
demonstrating a disregard for the law. Under the current
interpretation of § 924(c), however, both offenders would receive the
enhanced sentence for the later offenses. Similar to the retribution
theory's criticism of the current understanding of § 924(c), imposing
the enhanced sentence on all § 924(c) counts other than the first count
can be seen as incapacitating an offender for a disproportionately
longer period of time than corresponds to the dangerousness of his
conduct.
207. Id.
208. ROBINSON, supra note 188, at 89.
209. Id.
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4. Rehabilitation
Mandating twenty-five-year sentences for multiple § 924(c)
counts irrespective of the context or actual criminal conduct clearly
contradicts the rehabilitation rationale for punishment in many cases.
The rehabilitation theory seeks to keep an offender imprisoned for the
amount of time necessary to take away his inclination to engage in
criminal conduct and become a productive member of society.210 From
this perspective, the Middle District of Alabama criticized the current
interpretation of § 924(c), contending that 'locking a young man away
for his entire adult life does not serve a rehabilitative ... function, as
such a long sentence removes the incentive for reform and the hope
that the prisoner will go on to live a productive life."211 This
pessimistic perspective stems from the reality that even a young
offender with no criminal history will have the equivalent of a life
sentence if convicted of multiple § 924(c) violations, even if in a single
indictment. The First Circuit took a similar position regarding
subsequent offender statutes long before the Deal decision when it
concluded that "if reformation and retribution are the primary
purposes of the legislation, such ends would be served best by
applying the statutes only to those offenders who have been convicted
prior to the commission of the subsequent offense."
212
The current binding interpretation of § 924(c) creates unjust
results in application, as de facto life sentences are imposed on less
serious offenders. Under any theory of criminal punishment, the
imposition of the enhanced sentence to multiple § 924(c) counts in a
single indictment can lead to unjust and harmful results for criminal
defendants.
D. Mandatory Minimums and Judicial Sentencing Discretion
The interpretation of § 924(c) in Deal runs counter to the
current movement against mandatory minimums and toward judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing. The Supreme Court's 2005 decision
in United States v. Booker-which removed both the mandatory status
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the de novo
appellate review of sentencing departing from the Guidelines'
210. Id. at 87, 90.
211. United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
212. Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1955).
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range213-indicates a move back toward increased discretion of federal
district court judges in sentencing criminal offenders.
In 1984, after over two centuries of unlimited judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing
Commission to promulgate a Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
with ranges of sentences based on the type of offense and the type of
offender. 214 The federal statute asserted that the sentence ranges set
in the Guidelines were mandatory unless there was a sufficient
aggravating or mitigating circumstance not taken into account in the
formation of the Guidelines. 215 The Sentencing Guidelines were
drafted to create more uniformity in sentencing. 216
The mandatory Guidelines were in place in 1993 when the
Supreme Court handed down the Deal decision. But in 2005, the
previously uncontested mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines was overturned. 217 In United States v. Booker, the Supreme
Court found that the mandatory sentencing system violated the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial.218 The Court excised the portion of the
law directing courts to treat the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory, giving the Guidelines an advisory status.219 Though the
sentencing court must still calculate and consider the applicable
Guidelines sentence range,220 it can now "tailor the sentence" outside
of the Guidelines range to accommodate the particular conduct and
characteristics of a case. 221 In addition, the Booker Court changed the
standard of review for appellate judges from de novo to
unreasonableness review. 222 This decision has allowed for increased
judicial discretion in tailoring a sentence to fit the offender's actual
conduct.
This judicial discretion was bolstered two years later by Gall v.
United States, in which the Supreme Court called for an abuse of
discretion standard of review for all sentences, whether within, above,
213. 543 U.S. 220, 245, 261-62 (2005).
214. Christine M. Zeivel, Note, Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive Application of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI..-KENT L. REV. 395, 399-400 (2008).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
216. Booker, 543 U.S. at 253.
217. Id. at 245.
218. Zeivel, supra note 214, at 396-97.
219. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
220. Id. at 259; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
221. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46.
222. Id. at 261-62.
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or below the applicable Guidelines range.223 Thus, district judges can
impose a sentence within or outside of the range with less concern
about being overturned on appeal.
These Supreme Court decisions show a movement toward
increased judicial discretion in sentencing criminal offenders, and this
movement has had practical effects on sentencing: "Since the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, the
percentage of federal sentences falling within the range recommended
by the federal sentencing guidelines has decreased."224 In the year
following Booker, both the number of non-government-sponsored
below-range departures and the number of upward departures from
the Sentencing Guidelines more than doubled. 225 This discretion
allows judges to sentence offenders to terms in proportion to their
criminal conduct.
The Deal decision-applying the mandatory twenty-five-year
sentence of § 924(c)(1)(C) to all § 924(c) counts after the first count-
stands in stark contrast to the increased sentencing discretion given to
district court judges after Booker. Though not a part of the Sentencing
Guidelines, § 924(c) is part of the overall federal sentencing scheme.
While Booker gives judges discretion to prevent similar sentences for
dissimilar offenders, "unwarranted uniformity arises from blanket
application of mandatory minimum penalty statutes to a wide variety
of cases of differing seriousness and culpability. '" 226 Thus, even if a
judge finds that the actual conduct of an offender convicted of two
§ 924(c) counts is less serious than that of an offender sentenced to
less than thirty years, under the current interpretation of § 924(c), the
judge cannot craft the sentence to reflect this judgment. Instead, the
judge is forced to sentence the offender to thirty years' imprisonment
for the firearms counts alone.
This tension between Deal and Booker reflects a larger tension
between mandatory minimum sentences and the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines. Critics of mandatory minimums argue that "[a] mandatory
minimum deprives judges of the flexibility to tailor punishment to the
particular facts of the case and can result in an unduly harsh
sentence." 227 As Judge Cassell describes, 'Mandatory minimum
223. 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
224. Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More
Discretion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 425 (2006).
225. Id. at 433.
226. Id. at 445.
227. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1 (2010).
2011] 1039
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
sentences mean one-size-fits-all injustice."228 Harsh mandatory
minimums can "harm crime victims," "misdirect [federal] resources,"
and "bring the [criminal justice] system into disrepute in the eyes of
the public.' '229 Mandatory minimums can "harm crime victims" by
sending a distorted message, emphasizing the portion of the offense
covered by the sentencing statute (possession of a firearm) and
deemphasizing the substantive criminal offense (for example, drug
trafficking or a crime of violence). 230 Mandatory minimums can also
"misdirect [federal] funds" by incarcerating offenders for de facto life
sentences, which can cost the government more than $1,000,000,
rather than conserving federal funds and providing an opportunity for
the threat of harsher punishment for a subsequent offense to deter
offenders. 231 Furthermore, mandatory minimums can "bring the
system into disrepute in the eyes of the public" because public support
of mandatory minimums is declining, which may cause juries to acquit
offenders due to their perception that justice is not being served by
imposing harsh mandatory minimum sentences.
232
Both the number and type of critics of mandatory minimums
have grown; the Judicial Conference of the United States, legal
scholars, federal judges at the district court, appellate court, and
Supreme Court levels, members of Congress, and the general public
have all expressed reservations about the wisdom and necessity of
mandatory minimum sentences in practice. 233 A reduction in crime
rates is one of the central arguments in support of mandatory
minimum sentences, but studies have found that mandatory
minimums do not, in fact, have this effect. 23
4
Though counterintuitive at first, increased judicial discretion
can advance the goal of increased uniformity in sentencing, while
mandatory minimums can increase disparity in sentencing by rigidly
applying the same sentences to dissimilar offenders without
distinction. 235 Allowing for judicial discretion to consider the particular
seriousness and culpability of an offender reduces the disparity that




232. Id.; see also id. at 346 (reporting that studies have found that "support [for mandatory
minimum sentences] decreases significantly when people are asked to apply mandatory
sentences to specific cases").
233. Id. at 345-46.
234. Id. at 346; Nilsen, supra note 13, at 556 (reporting that "[a] recent study shows no
connection between mandatory sentencing and the reduction of crime').
235. Hofer, supra note 224, at 442-47.
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results from blanket application of a sentencing scheme. 236 Thus,
giving district court judges more discretion allows them to depart from
the Guidelines range or "reject a plea-bargained sentence if [the judge]
determines.., that the sentence does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the defendant's actual conduct."237 Proponents of
judicial sentencing discretion find that "being able to customize
sentences can increase fairness in the judicial process."238 It is district
judges who hear the facts of the case during the actual trial, and it is
district judges who have experience sentencing criminal defendants.
Accordingly, district judges are likely in the best position to impose
similar sentences on individuals who have engaged in similar real,
criminal conduct. 239 In this way, this movement toward increased
judicial discretion allows for more equitable sentencing of criminal
offenders.
The mandatory sentencing add-ons imposed by § 924(c),
especially in the event of multiple § 924(c) counts in the indictment,
often force the imposition of an unjustly harsh sentence, counter to the
long-term sentencing trend giving discretion to judges to tailor
sentences to the actual culpable behavior of an offender. The blanket
application of this mandatory minimum thus forces judges to treat
different cases similarly, in direct opposition to the current sentencing
movement advocating judicial discretion.
IV. SOLUTION: LET'S MAKE A DEAL
Under the current interpretation, multiple § 924(c) counts
mandate the equivalent of a life sentence. This sentence is
disproportionately severe, as the actions of these offenders almost
certainly do not match the seriousness of other offenses meriting a life
sentence, such as murder.240 Due to the lack of support in subsequent
case law, statutory construction, purposes of punishment, and
sentencing trends, the Court's holding in Deal-defining "second or
subsequent conviction" as a finding of guilt preceding sentencing and
thus applying the enhanced sentence to multiple § 924(c) counts in a
236. Id. at 444-45.
237. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252 (2005).
238. Amir Efrati, Looser Rules on Sentencing Stir Concerns About Equity, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 2009, at A15.
239. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 250 (highlighting the need "to base punishment upon ... the
real conduct that underlies the crime of conviction" for less sentencing disparity to occur).
240. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.1 (2009) (assigning a base offense level of




single indictment-must be reevaluated. "Second or subsequent
conviction" must be understood to apply only to § 924(c) offenses
occurring after a previous § 924(c) indictment and conviction. There
are two main avenues from which to readdress this precedent:
Congress or the Supreme Court.
A. Congress
Congress has the power to amend the wording of § 924(c) to
clarify the proper application of the statute if it finds the current
application of the statute to create objectionable outcomes for
offenders. The statutorily mandated sentence grudgingly imposed by
the Middle District of Alabama in United States v. Jefferson is a clear
example of the disagreeable result of the statute's present
interpretation. 241  In response, Congress could articulate that
§ 924(c)(1)(C) is to be understood as a purely recidivist provision, or
affirm the Deal majority's interpretation that the enhanced sentence
can apply to multiple § 924(c) counts in a single indictment.
Alternatively, Congress could add language to express a different
understanding of the applicability of the enhanced sentence.
Based on the post-Deal criticism, the context of the statute's
enactment, and the purposes of punishment, Congress should amend
§ 924(c)(1)(C) to express that the enhanced sentence for a "second or
subsequent conviction" applies only to offenses committed after
previous conviction of a § 924(c) violation. This interpretation would
prevent de facto life sentences for first-time offenders facing multiple
§ 924(c) counts in a single proceeding. After the indictment and
conviction, a defendant has notice that possession of a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence is an
additional criminal offense.
This interpretation is more in accord with the purposes of
punishment. Conviction of a § 924(c) offense would provide sufficient
notice, and therefore deterrence, to an offender that another § 924(c)
violation will result in a harsher sentence. This application of
§ 924(c)(1)(C) is in line with both the retribution and incapacitation
theories of criminal punishment, as it would incapacitate the most
blameworthy and dangerous recidivists for a longer period of time.
242
241. 302 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2004). Jefferson was convicted of two drug
trafficking offenses and two § 924(c) offenses. Id. at 1296. The court imposed the enhanced
sentence for the second § 924(c) count, even though the offenses were committed concurrently.
Id. at 1297. For further description of the case, see supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 188, 190, 208 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the statute was originally enacted during a period in
which similar-sounding provisions were understood as applying to
recidivists,243 and the "second or subsequent conviction" language
should be understood as such.
This congressional clarification would remove any ambiguity in
the statutory language, therefore eliminating the need to employ
many of the tools of statutory interpretation in the first place. The
plain meaning of the statute would be clear.
B. Supreme Court
If a case involving multiple § 924(c) counts is appealed to the
Supreme Court, the Court could grant a petition for a writ of certiorari
and reconsider its interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(C) in Deal. Overturning
this precedent will present a difficult task, however. As the Supreme
Court itself has articulated, "the burden borne by the party advocating
the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the
Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction."244 For the
Supreme Court to overturn a statutory construction decision, the
Court must find that (1) subsequent changes in the law "have removed
or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,"
(2) subsequent law "has rendered the decision irreconcilable with
competing legal doctrines or policies," (3) there exists "inherent
confusion created by an unworkable decision," or (4) the holding "poses
a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in
other laws."245 The Supreme Court would need to find one or more of
these special justifications present to overturn its decision in Deal, as
stare decisis does not take into account whether the interpretation
was correct when initially decided.
246
There is a strong argument for overturning this precedent due
to conflicting sentencing policies and goals articulated in subsequent
case law. In this instance, the 2005 Booker decision and subsequent
sentencing practices have weakened the broad conceptual framework
into which the statute fits. The mandatory sentence imposed by
§ 924(c)(1)(C) and its inflexible application conflicts with the advisory
status of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Sentencing judges now
have discretion to move outside of the Guidelines' range to craft an
243. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
244. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
245. Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
246. Id. at 175 n.1.
2011] 1043
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
appropriate punishment for the defendant's conduct. Thirty
mandatory years for two § 924(c) counts, rather than ten years, can
easily frustrate the judge's overall aim to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to punish the criminal
behavior. 247 Even though § 924(c) is not part of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the statute works in tandem with the Guidelines in
composing a sentence. The interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(C)'s mandatory
enhanced sentences has obstructed district court judges from their
overall goal to fashion a reasonable and just sentence for criminal
behavior. In this sense, the advisory status of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the current interpretation of the mandatory statutory
§ 924(c) sentences are irreconcilable policies, calling for the Supreme
Court to reconsider its holding in Deal.
In a similar fashion, Deal poses a direct obstacle to realization
of sentencing discretion embodied in subsequent case law. The post-
Booker increase in sentencing discretion allows trial court judges to
impose sentences that they find to be reasonable based on the
offender's actual conduct. Federal district court judges are in the best
position to determine the relative severity and blameworthiness of a
defendant's action, as they deal almost daily with suspected and
convicted criminal offenders, whether in plea proceedings, trials,
sentencing proceedings, or other matters before the court. Requiring
the imposition of de facto life sentences for offenders with multiple
§ 924(c) counts eliminates this discretion in many cases, forcing trial
judges to impose unjustly severe sentences.
Because the interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(C) under Deal directly
conflicts with the current goals and policies in criminal sentencing as
established in subsequent case law, the Supreme Court should revisit
and overturn the holding in Deal. The Court should hold that "second
or subsequent conviction" refers to the finding of guilt and sentencing,
thus employing § 924(c)(1)(C) as a recidivist provision. The enhanced
sentence, therefore, would apply only to offenders who commit a
§ 924(c) violation after a previous § 924(c) indictment and conviction.
C. Mandatory Minimum Sentence Reforms
Judge Cassell, who in United States v. Angelos reluctantly
sentenced a first-time offender to fifty-five years for three § 924(c)
counts, has proposed alternative reforms to both the interpretation in
Deal and the recidivist interpretation of § 924(c)'s mandatory
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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minimum sentence for a "second or subsequent conviction. '248 One
alternative is for Congress to completely abolish mandatory minimum
sentences and instead impose sentences based solely on the advisory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 249 If not a total repeal, Congress could
also limit the scope of mandatory minimum sentences, reserving them
for only the most serious and dangerous offenses. 250 If Congress did
not want to repeal any part of its sentencing statutes, an alternative
would be to pass a sentencing statute allowing district judges to
depart from mandatory minimums to impose a sentence proportionate
to the offender's role in the offense, the seriousness of the offense, and
other relevant circumstances. 25 1 This course of action would give the
district judge discretion to "impose a sentence below a mandatory
minimum when[, for example,] a defendant has limited involvement in
an offense."252 This would be especially beneficial in situations in
which the Guidelines' advisory sentence range and the mandatory
minimum sentence differ significantly.
Judge Cassell observed that "the two [current sentencing]
systems are 'structurally and functionally at odds.' "253 He found the
above reforms to be preferable to the current dual federal sentencing
system because "the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines form a
rational backbone for any sentencing system" and with deference to
the Guidelines, "the public could have confidence whenever a judge
imposed a sentence that it was consistent with that called for by the
nation's expert sentencing agency," the Sentencing Commission.
254
Amending the scope or application of mandatory minimums in any of
the ways suggested by Judge Cassell would also give more deference
to district judges to impose a sentence tailored to the particular
offender, rather than require them to apply a mandatory statute
regardless of the character of the offender and the context of the
offense. Due to the sheer number of sentencing hearings, district
judges have more experience and expertise than Congress with
crafting sentences for criminal defendants. Thus, giving more
deference and discretion to the Sentencing Commission and district
248. See Cassell, supra note 12, at 348-49 (describing alternatives to unstacking § 924(c)
mandatory penalties).
249. Id. at 348.
250. Id. at 348-49.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 348.




judges would allow for more equitable and consistent sentencing of
offenders.
V. CONCLUSION
The Deal majority contended that the definition and
application of an enhanced sentence for a "second or subsequent
conviction" under § 924(c) is "unambiguous." 255 However, the prior line
of cases interpreting "conviction" as a finding of guilt and
sentencing, 256 Deal's highly critical dissent, 257 and the subsequent
criticism in its application 258 all cast doubt on this "unambiguous"
interpretation. The theories and tools of statutory interpretation, the
purposes of criminal punishment, and the movement toward increased
judicial discretion in sentencing all further undermine the majority's
assertion that "second or subsequent conviction" should include
multiple counts alleged in a single indictment. A reinterpretation
should allow for a sentence proportionate to the blameworthiness of
the conduct of the hypothetical offender and provide him with a
greater chance of rehabilitation and the opportunity to lead a crime-
free life upon release. If Congress revises, or the Supreme Court
reinterprets, the language or interpretation of § 924(c) in the way
suggested in this Note, defendants like the hypothetical offender
described in the Introduction will be shielded from the mandatory
imposition of a de facto life sentence for actions that, comparatively,
do not merit such a severe punishment.
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